The Future of the Regulatory State: Adaptation, Transformation or Demise? by Lodge, Martin & Sitter, Nick
  
  
The Centre for  
European 
and Asian Studies 
 
 
 
REPORT 
 
1/2011 
ISSN 1500-2683 
 
 
The Future of the Regulatory State: 
Adaptation, Transformation or Demise? 
 
 
Martin Lodge (LSE) & Nick Sitter (BI) 
 
 
 
A publication from: 
Centre for European and Asian Studies at 
BI Norwegian Business School  
0442, Oslo 
Norway 
 
 
Prepared for the SOG 2011 Workshop 
The Future of the Regulatory State: Adaptation, Transformation, or Demise? 
15/6 September 2011, BI Norwegian Business School  
 
 
SOG (Structure and Organisation of Government) is a research committee of the International Political 
Science Association. This workshop is part of the wider SOG-related activities in executive politics. 
 
The Future of the Regulatory State: Adaptation, 
Transformation or Demise? 
 
Martin Lodge & Nick Sitter 
 
 
Introduction 
This short paper is meant to provide for some background ideas to motivate discussions 
during our workshop. It therefore seeks to make a few short (and hopefully somewhat 
provocative) points. The idea of the ‘regulatory state’ is one that has occupied social 
scientists for at least two decades, given the growing interest in the changes of 
statehood that went hand-in-hand (at least in Western Europe in the late 1980s) with 
programmes of privatisation and liberalisation. These trends were summarised in 
Majone’s diagnosis of the ‘rise of the regulatory state’ (Majone 1994, 1996, 1997), at the 
EU-level (as the European Commission expanded its influence over content given 
budgetary constraints) and at the national level. 
 
By the 1990s the regulatory state was very much an idea which time had come. The 
combination of new right public choice analysis of the state, political turns to the right, 
and the mounting cost of industrial policy and the welfare state provided the domestic 
drivers behind liberalisation and the increased focus on indirect regulatory tools. 
Internationally the EU’s effort to establish a Single European Market combined with the 
wave of globalisation that followed the collapse of communism made fertile ground for 
the switch to regulatory policy tools. The ‘regulatory explosion’ (Levi-Faur 2006a) that 
followed cemented a shift to rule-based indirect governance at the national, regional 
and international level. By 2011, however, the regulatory state faces a less benign 
environment, in terms of concepts and ideas as well as domestic politics and the 
international political economy. 
 
This ‘age’ of the regulatory state was characterised by two elements. One key element 
has been the reliance on private or market-type actors that provide ‘public services’. 
The second element was an emphasis on oversight and control by regulatory agencies 
and through contractual, formalised devices. As such, the regulatory state could be 
seen as a programmatic idea as well as a technology of governing that sought to 
introduce synoptic oversight and ‘predictability’ into the governance of an ever-
increasing number of public spaces (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2010, Lodge 2008, 
Moran 2003). Underpinning these institutional-organisational changes were 
administrative doctrines that advocated the creation of free-standing organisations 
tasked with focused oversight, backed by justifications that concentrated on efficiency 
as core administrative value. Both elements are facing important challenges, 
conceptually as well as empirically. 
 
These points have been made forcefully by Power (1997, 2006), who argued that the 
‘audit society’ was leading to control systems that risked being little else than dangerous 
‘rituals of verification’ given their questionable validity, and by Roberts (2010) who 
argued that changes associated with the regulatory state could be seen as an 
expression of a ‘logic of discipline’. At the same time, the idea of the ‘regulatory state’ 
has been challenged by those who argue that the concept does not sufficiently account 
for wider ideas that can be more conveniently labelled ‘regulatory capitalism’. Part of 
this critique involves the argument that the ‘regulatory state’ fails to take sufficient 
account of the ‘de-centred’ nature of regulation. Whereas the ‘regulatory state’ is said to 
be too ‘state-centric’ (in focusing in particular on the behaviour of regulatory agencies 
and control instruments), the idea of ‘decentred regulation’ points to the organisational 
fragmentation of regulatory regimes, the considerable (historical) reliance on non-state 
(i.e. private) regulation, and the growing significance of regulation involving state and 
non-state actors at the international/transnational/European level. However, we suggest 
that the idea of the ‘regulatory state’ as a programmatic idea and a technology of control 
is sufficiently ‘stretchable’ to include such developments. 
 
On the one hand, the ideas of the regulatory state are said to have become embedded 
across national political economies. The institutions of the ‘regulatory state’ (i.e. 
primarily agencies) and its instruments (i.e. market-based regulatory tools such as 
performance-based and management-based standards, called ‘new governance’ by 
Carrigan and Coglianese 2011) have become institutionalised in being accepted in 
practice and having become a ‘normal’ focus of academic attention.  
 
On the other hand, these ideas have come under increasing challenge, by various 
regulatory scandals throughout the Naughties and in the context of the financial crisis. 
In addition, there has also been an increasing awareness of the limits of particular 
regulatory strategies and emerging paradoxes. For example, there has been a growing 
awareness of the limits of management-based standards (Gunningham and Sinclair 
2009), of the difficulties to deal with performance-based standards when the ‘producer’ 
is able to game output or outcome data, and there have also been contrasting views 
regarding the tensions between ‘responsive’ and ‘risk-based’ enforcement strategies. 
 
The success of efforts to establish depoliticised solutions to political questions 
depended on a degree of policy consensus, and it was always possible that 
developments on the ground might undermine this in any given case. Indeed short term 
success has, in some sectors, given way to medium-term scepticism toward the 
achievements of regulatory regimes. Although the regulatory state may have become a 
form of new consensus inasmuch regulation as set of policy tools has become 
widespread and less contested in principle that it was twenty years ago, the very variety 
of regulatory regimes has prompted a research agenda oriented to the empirical 
challenges of the regulatory state (also Levi-Faur 2006b).  
 
Challenges 
Empirical challenges to the regulatory state (i.e. control failures) and the growing 
awareness of the inherent paradoxes and potential limitations of regulatory instruments 
have been the animating idea for this workshop. The diagnosed age of the regulatory 
state has come under increasing challenge. Three challenges are particularly prominent 
and all three point to potential limitations of the regulatory state to offer sufficient 
problem-solving capacity. 
 
The limits of regulatory regimes: One of the key arguments over the past decade or so 
has been that the initial regulatory regimes for liberalised markets have proven to be 
inappropriate or have generated considerable undesirable side-effects. For example, 
instruments that emphasised efficiency were said to have neglected the importance of 
incentivising investment into infrastructure modernisation. Arguably, the regulatory state 
was only a ‘fair-weather’ state that did not have any solutions once the going got tough.  
Elsewhere, a reliance on self-regulation (private certifications schemes) has also been 
questioned in terms of their legitimacy and actual information-gathering and 
enforcement capacity. Furthermore, much of the literature and attention has focused on 
single regulatory interventions or aspects of regulatory regimes, whereas the cumulative 
effect and the fragmented nature in which different organisations (at different levels of 
government). Politically, it might also be said that regulatory regimes have become 
increasingly contested, both in terms of interest constellations and in terms of value-
basis.  
 
The limits of market-based problem-solving: One of the most disturbing elements of the 
pre-financial crisis era was the arrogance in which particular regulatory instruments 
were praised as being the technocratic holy grail. Instruments such as ‘risk-based 
regulation’ were promoted as enforcement elements that offered the technocratic 
solution to limited resources, while also suggesting that societies would come to accept 
that regulators were not able to secure against all risks. Whereas the scandals of the 
late 1990s (for example, BSE) could be seen as failures of ‘old’ regulatory regimes, the 
failures of the late 2000s (especially in financial regulation) were the failures of these 
supposedly high-intelligence, light-touch instruments. Unfortunately, in the UK at least, 
these instruments could not deal with the institutional conflicts between a blame-
avoiding Chancellor, a central banker keen on avoiding ‘moral hazard’ and an agency 
wedded to light-touch regulation. Elsewhere, too, the idea of introducing HACCP into 
food regulation have been far from unproblematic: food inspectors do not wish to 
protocolise their judgements. In other words, in their obsession to provide for ‘mechanic’ 
procedural and protocolised instruments, the advocates of ‘modern’ regulatory tools 
forgot the strain such instruments would place on inter-organisational relations and on 
the regulatory/bureaucratic frontline.  
 
The limits of national regulatory capacity: Issues of risk, anxiety and uncertainty have 
challenged the capacity of regulators (both national and transnational) to advise on and 
decide in highly politicised domains. Regardless of trends of growing societal anxiety, 
there have been calls for growing regulatory capacity at the transnational level, at least 
in terms of standard-setting and in terms of mutual monitoring. Such regimes also 
include private regimes (such as certification regimes). These developments raise 
issues as to how different aspects of increasingly transnational regimes can be ‘joined 
up’ with the actual regulatory enforcement ‘on the ground’, and how national regulatory 
regimes can be adjusted to reflect the transnational nature of much of the contemporary 
economy. However, calls for internationalisation and standardisation are also 
challenged by popular distrust that shaped much of contemporary ‘risk society’ (Beck 
1992, Chalmers 2005). 
 
There are also some intellectual challenges. In a forthcoming review of the Oxford 
Handbook of Regulation, Mick Moran suggests that the study of regulation threatens to 
become increasing irrelevant for three critical reasons. One is the intellectual 
dominance of ‘northern hemisphere’ (with some Australian accents) in terms of 
concepts and assumptions. This is not to say that the ‘south’ is not interested in these 
concepts, but in its interest in following intellectual concerns, we may be missing some 
important or interesting debates. Second, Moran notes the intellectual dominance of 
‘econocrat’ concepts and discourses. Even those argument that seek to find a non-
economic ‘defence’ of other ideas (such as the ‘public interest’) are undertaken from a 
defensive standpoint. Third, he also argues that there has been too much of a focus on 
the ‘national’ level. There are answers to these challenges: much of regulation is about 
economic activity, the national level is of continued importance, regardless of the 
significance of the transnational although the set of questions may arguably require 
some adjustment, and the dominance of particular centres of knowledge generation is 
inherent in scientific production. 
 
In selecting the themes for this workshop, we were mindful of such concerns, as 
reflected in the sessions on the ‘regulatory state’, on ‘agencies’, on the idea of the 
regulatory state operating in different ‘habitats’ and then, on the second day, on 
regulatory strategies and regulators at the national and the EU levels. 
 
Tensions in the regulatory state 
 The process of institutionalisation of ideas associated with the regulatory state and the 
above challenges have led to considerable tensions. These tensions can be illustrated 
by the growing contestations regarding the regulatory state. Without claiming to offer an 
exhaustive or mutually exclusive account, we note three discussions below. 
 
Does the growing colonisation of regulatory state ideas lead to growing homogenisation, 
differentiation and/or feedback processes in which the ‘periphery’ influences the core of 
the regulatory state? In other words, what have been the consequences of ever-more 
domains being included in regulatory state dynamics? Has there been an emergence of 
synoptic control, or are we witnessing differentiation? In the UK (and arguably 
elsewhere), liberalisation and privatisation were first applied to comparatively easy and 
uncontroversial sectors such as telecommunications, but ran into problems when 
applies to more difficult areas such as railways, let alone health and education. Likewise, 
is the application of the regulatory state logic to increasingly difficulty (inappropriate?) 
sectors undermining the regulatory state and setting the stage for a backlash?  
 
Is hybridity a tool for stabilisation or destabilisation?  Hybrids have been widely seen as 
both a tool and an outcome of regulatory strategies. Understanding hybrids as a tool 
means that regulatory approaches draw on mixed approaches (responsive regulation is 
arguably such a hybrid). Hybrid instruments are said to provide for more stability and 
fewer side-effects than ‘elegant’ regulatory instruments. Hybridity as an outcome points 
to the irritant effects that any regulatory intervention has on existing understandings 
within particular regulatory settings. In other words, regulatory change, even at the 
transnational level, ‘layers’ onto existing formal and informal understandings. Such 
layering (for historical institutionalists at least) leads to considerable tension and 
pressure for adaptation - with uncertain outcomes. For system-theory oriented scholars 
such as Teubner, the end result of such processes is, at best, an ‘irritant effect’.  
 
Finally, the regulatory state is exposed to both centripetal as well as centrifugal 
tendencies (see also Black 2007). The logic of the regulatory state as a programmatic 
idea (and as technology) is centripetal: it seeks to centralise and makes things 
calculable. Indeed, much of the better regulation movement can be seen as being 
motivated in preventing the ever-growing scope of the regulatory state to become so 
differentiated and different that it lacks control. As a consequence, much energy has 
been spent on devising methodologies and organisations that provide for centripetal 
dynamics within the regulatory state. In contrast, there are also considerable centrifugal 
forces. For one, sector-specific dynamics need to accommodate regulatory state logics, 
leading to differentiated patterns across sectors and states. Furthermore, different 
sectors witness also different degrees of attention. It might, therefore, be argued that 
the ideas underlying the regulation of European energy markets have changed 
considerably over the past ten years (seeing energy as a strategic good of geopolitical 
importance, contrasting with an earlier period where portfolio-based markets were seen 
as appropriate). Similar dynamics are increasingly likely to occur in other domains - 
where other issues may be of importance, such as demographic developments in health, 
or climate change or sustainability in environmental regulation. A third source for 
centrifugal dynamics is the asymmetric transnationalisation of different regulatory 
activities. All three dynamics point towards a repoliticisation of regulation: more political 
contestation over the appropriate goals of regulation than characterised the first two 
decades of the regulatory state. 
 
Adaptation, Transformation or Demise? 
We would not suggest that the practical importance of regulation for the daily operations 
of national and transnational governance is unlikely to decline. We are also not 
proposing a new manifesto for the study of regulation. However, the above challenges 
are of relevance both the scholars and practitioners of regulation. They offer a 
fascinating ground for the study of regulation. Nevertheless, for students of regulation 
(i.e. us), these dynamics raise the challenge as to whether our existing lenses are 
sufficiently adaptable to critically accommodate the changing nature of 
capitalisms/market economies (in all their forms), whether they require a radical 
rethinking as we are stuck in Anglo-centric, nation-centric and ‘econocratic’-lenses in 
order to please the hegemonic ideas dictating our disciplines (and peer-review 
standards). If the latter interpretation is right, then we are either required to seek a 
transformation in the way we look at the substantive changes occurring in front of us, or 
the language of regulation and the regulatory state will become irrelevant as scholarly 
attention moves to other concepts. 
 
 
 
 
